Divorce -- Decree Must Specify Prevailing Party by Travers, George
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
10-1-1959
Divorce -- Decree Must Specify Prevailing Party
George Travers
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
George Travers, Divorce -- Decree Must Specify Prevailing Party, 14 U. Miami L. Rev. 118 (1959)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol14/iss1/11
118 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court opinion in the Wilburn case engendered much
unfavorable comment.22 The court of appeals in the A/S J. Ludwig
Mowinckels Rederi case appeared determined that the Wilburn rule
should not be recklessly expanded. The fact situation before the court
was ideal to defeat any possible cxtcntion of the Wilburn nle. An
indemnity provision in any contract approaches the field of insurance as
close as possible without actually entering the realm of that subject. 3
Should the decision of the court of appeals be either affirmed by the
Supreme Court2 4 or followed by the other circuits, the day of Wilburn
with its tendency toward the application of state law in the field of maritime
contracts may well be in its twilight.25
MICHAEL C. SLOTNICK
DIVORCE-DECREE MUST SPECIFY PREVAILING PARTY
In a divorce action the complainant wife alleged extreme cruelty and
requested custody of the child. Her husband counterclaimed for divorce
on the ground of extreme cruelty and also sought custody of the child.
The court entered a decree granting a divorce without specifically adjudi-
cating the equities for and against the parties and granted temporary
custody of the child to the husband. Held, the chancellor must reconsider
and specifically determine by his final decree the party entitled to the
divorce. Friedman v. Friedman, 100 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1958).
English ecclesiastical courts allowed a defendant to counterclaim for
affirmative relief in a divorce suit by setting out the misconduct of the
22. For a severely critical analysis of the Wilburn case see GILMORE & BLACK,
AnmIRALTY 61-63 (1957); see also Comment, 50 Nw. U. L. Rv. 677, 681-83 (1955);
Note, 1 N. Y. L. F. 360 (1955). For a more favorable comment see Note, 103 U. PA.
L. REV. 813 (1955); see also Note, 35 B. U. L. REV. 435 (1955).
23. An insurance contract contains five elements: one party possesses an insurable
interest; the interest is subject to some well-defined peril, which may cause loss to the
riskbearer; the other party to the contract assumes the risk of loss ;the contract is an
integral part of a general scheme for distributing the loss; and the insured makes a
ratable contribution. Where only the first three elements are present, a risk shifting
device results. An indemnity provision in a contract belongs to the category of risk-
shifting devices. VANCE, INSURANCE 1-5 (3d ed. 1951).
24. A/S 7. Ludwig Mowinckes Rederi v. Commercial Stevedoring Co. has been
filed on the appellate docket of the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari. 27
U. S. L. WEEK 3057 (Sept. 9, 1958),
25. Gilmore and Black in their recent hornbook on admiralty inquire as to the
meaning of the Wilburn case: "Wilburu may mean merely that the States are to have
a limited competency to regulate certain terms of marine policies. It could as a matter
of cold logic be read to mean that there is no federal maritime law at all. It may very
well turn out to mean anything between these extremes." GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY
63 (1957). The A/S 1. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi case, limiting the Wilburn case to
maritime insurance, appears to answer this inquiry.
1. The court also reversed a companion case, on the same grounds, Hlowell v.
Howell, 100 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1958).
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plaintiff.2 This defense, recrimination, 3 acted as a plea in bar and if the
defendant was himself free from blame he could obtain relief as if he were
the plaintiff. 4 When both parties were at fault relief would be denied to
both of them. Denial rested on the equitable maxim that, "he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands."' , This reasoning still serves to
bar many divorce actions. However, it has been relaxed to permit
termination in law of certain marriages which have ceased to exist in fact2
Another approach relaxing recrimination in divorce actions is the doctrine
of comparative rectitude.8 Rather than completely bar a divorce where
both parties are guilty, this doctrine allows relief to the lesser offender. 9
Some states specifically refuse to recognize this approach.'0
In the instant case the problem arose when the trial court did not
award relief to one party or deny relief to both parties. Instead it
granted relief to both parties by, in effect, dissolving the marriage.
Ordinarily, in civil actions, a decree should show in whose favor and
against whom it is rendered or it will be held void for uncertainty.1
However, there is a strong line of decisions in divorce cases affirming
decrees which fail to specify which party prevailed in the divorce action.12
Actually, a decision which fails to name a victor in no way affects the
2. Hatfield v. Hatfield, 103 W.Va. 135, 167 S.E. 89, 91 (1932).
3. "Recrimination is a showing by defendant of any cause of divorce against the
plaintiff in bar of plaintiff's cause of divorce." McCullum v. McCullum, 301 S.W.2d
565, 566 (Ark. 1957).
4. Berdolt v. Berdolt, 56 Neb. 792, 77 N.W. 399 (1898); Ames v. Ames, 109
Misc. 171, 178 N.Y. Supp. 177 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
5. Harton v. Little, 188 Ala, 640, 65 So. 951, 952 (1914).
6. Veazy v. Blair, 86 Ga.App. 721. 72 S.E.2d 481 (1952); Gullett v. Cullett,
25 Ird. 517 (1865); Butcher v. Butcher. 296 Ky. 740, 178 SV.2d 616 (1944).
7. Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff, 144 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
8. "The doctrine of comparative rectitude may be defined as the principle that
where both parties are guilty of misconduct for which a divorce may be granted, the
court will grant a divorce to the one who is less at fault." 17 Am. JOR. Divorce &
Separation §265 (1957); Busch v. Busch, 68 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1953); Lassen v. Lassen,
134 Kan. 436, 7 P.2d 120 (1932); Panther v. Panther, 147 Okla. 131, 295 Pac. 219
(1928).
9. Barnes, J., referred to the doctrine of recrimination as follows: "It is not an
absolute but a qualifying doctrine. If it were to be applied strictly great inequity would
be done, for it so often happens that neither party to a suit has been free from fault."
Stewart v. Stewart, 158 Fla. 326, 327, 328, 29 So.2d 247, 248 (1946); Annot., 170 A.L.R.
1073 (1946). Accord, Dunn v. Dunn, 217 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1948); McFadden v.
McFadden, 213 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. 1948); Marr v. Marr, 191 S.W,2d 512 (Tex. 1943);
Hendricks v. Hendricks, 123 Utah 178, 257 P.2d 366 (1953).
10. Blankanship v. Blankanship, 51 Nev. 356, 276 Pac. 9 (1929); Sandrene v.
Sandrcne, 121 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1952); Karth v. Karth, 78 Ohio App. 517, 71 N.E.2d
520 (1946).
11. McFadden v. McFadden, 157 Fla. 477, 26 So.2d 502 (1946); Brewies v.
Brewies, 27 Tenn. App. 68, 179 S.E.2d 84 (1943).
12. Crimditch v. Crimditch, 71 Ariz. 194, 225 P.2d 489 (1950); Ackel v. Ackel,
57 Ariz. 14, 110 P.2d 238 (1941); Schuster v. Schuster, 42 Ariz. 190, 23 P.2d 559(1933); Brown v. Brown, 38 Ariz. 459, 300 Pac. 452 (1921); Finnegan v. Finnegan,
76 Idaho 500, 285 P.2d 488 (1955); Hulett v. IHulett, 152 Miss. 476, 119 So. 581
(1928); Flagg v. Flagg, 192 Wash. 679, 74 P.2d 189 (1937).
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decree of the court where custody of children, 13 alimony,' 4 and disposition
of property's are concerned as these matters are within the sound discretion
of the court.16 This type of decree has been attacked because of uncertainty 7
and because it creates in effect an annulment of a valid marriage not
provided for by divorce statutes.'8
In this decision the court has specifically receded from its position in
Williamson v. Williamson.9 There the court held: "the failure of the
chancellor to make specific findings of fact in an equity suit is not a
reversible error."20o The trial court in the Williamson case had merely divorced
each party from the other as had the trial court in the instant case. The
court in the instant case has specifically reaffirmed its subsequent stand in
Sahler v. Sahler2' and MacFadden v. MacFadden.2 Both of these cases held
that designation of the successful party was necessary. A decision of the court
somewhat consistent with the Friedman decision may be found in Knox v.
Knox 23 which held in substance that a decree which fails to specify the victor
is not improper if the record obviously discloses the party in whose favor
the divorce was decreed. This same conclusion has been reached by the
Supreme Courts of California24 and Texas. 25 In Batteiger v. Batteiger,2 6
a Florida case decided since the Friedman case, the court held that an
original final decree which failed to award a divorce specifically to one
of the parties was in error.
It is the writer's opinion that the court here missed an opportunity
to reaffirm its progressive divorce decision in the Williamson case.27 There
seems to be no reason for determining which is the victor between two
guilty parties. As stated before, there is no need for a victor in resolving
13. Landy v. Landy, 62 So.2d 707 (Fla. 1953); Hastings v. Hastings, 45 So.2d 115
(Fla. 1950); Johnson v. Johnson, 214 La. 912, 39 So.2d 340 (1949).
14. Lindley v. Lindley, 84 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1955); Kahn v. Kahn, 78 So.2d 367
(Fla. 1955); Pross v. Pross, 72 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1954); Longino v. Longino, 67 So.2d
203 (Fla. 1953).
15. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 171 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Porter v. Porter, 67 Ariz.
273, 195 P,2d 132 (1948); Edwards v. Edwards, 262 S.W.ld 130 (Ark. 1953);
1Halberstadt v. lalberstadt, 72 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1954).
16. See cases cited note 10 supra.
17. See cases cited notes 13, 14, 15 supra.
18. "Action for divorce is distinguished from one for annulment in that divorce
action is predicated on valid marriage and decree terminates relationship from date
thereof while annulment destroys existence of void or voidable marriage and everything
appertaining thereto from the beginning." Widger v. Widger, 14 N.J. Misc. 880, 881,
188 Adt. 235, 236 (1936).
19. 153 Fla. 357, 14 So.2d 712 (1943).
20. Id. at 358, 14 So.2d 713.
21. 154 Fla. 477, 17 So.2d 105 (1944).
22. 157 Fla. 477, 26 So.2d 502 (1946).
23. 159 Fla. 206, 31 So.2d 159 (1947).
24. Ramacciotti v. Ramacciotti, 131 Cal. App. 191, 20 P.2d 961 (1933).
25. Broner v. Broner, 267 S.W,2d 577 (Tex. 1953).
26. Batteiger v. Batteiger, 109 So.2d 602, 603 (Fla. App. 1959).
27. Williamson v. Williamson, 153 Fla. 357, 14 So.2d 712 (1943).
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issues of child custody,28 alimony,2D and property disposition.30 Our society
often imposes cruel punishments on the party who is said to have lost
in a divorce action. There is no reason why one party or the other should
be burdened for life with this social stigma.
GEORGE TRAVERS
TORTS: AIRPLANE NOT WITHIN GUEST STATUTE
An action was brought for damages resulting from the death of a
guest in the crash of a private airplane in Florida. The complaint alleged
lack of ordinary care by the pilot. Defendant's demurrer, relying on
plaintiff's failure to allege gross negligence as required by the Florida
Guest Statute,' was overruled. Held, affirmed, an airplane is not a "motor
vehicle" within the meaning of the Florida Guest Statute. Gridley v.
Cardenas, 3 Wis. 2d 623, 89 N.W. 2d 286 (1958).
The Florida Supreme Court has never determined whether an airplane
is a "motor vehicle" within the Florida Guest Statute.2 Only two jurisdic-
tions have defined the same term within their own guest statutes,8 and
both reached the same result as the instant case. In each decision, the
court relied on the vernacular 4 and statutory5 definition of "motor vehicles"
and utilized the rules of statutory construction embodied in McBoyle v.
28. Cases cited note 13 supra.
29. Cases cited note 14 supra.
30. Cases cited note 15 supra.
I. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1957) "No person transported by the owner or operator
of a motor vehicle as his guest or passenger, without payment for such transportation,
shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury,
death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the
gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such
motor vehicle " (Emphasis added.)
2. The Flonida Supreme Court refu3ed to rule on a question of this nature,
certified to it by the Osceola County Circuit Court. The reason given was improper
certification by the lower court. Sieverts v. Loffer, 45 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1950).
3. In re Hayden's Estate, 174 Kian. 140, 254 P.2d 813 (1953); Hanson v. Lewis,
11 Ohio Op. 42, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 105 (C.P. 1937).
4. "Vehicle-that in or on which a person or thing is or may be carried from
one place to another, esp. along the ground, also through the air; . . . a means of
conveyance. Motor-the causing, setting up, or imparting motion. Equipped with or
driven by a motor or motors. Of or pertaining to automotive vehicles . . . . To ride in,
travel by, or drive, a motor-propelled vehicle, as an automobile or airship." WEBSTER,
NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2824 (2d ed. 1950).
5. KAr. STAT. ANN. ch. 8, §126 (1957) "Vehicle-Every device in, upon or by
which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway,
excepting devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or
tracks. Motor vehicle- Every vehicle, as herein defined, which is self-propelled." Ono
REv. CoD ANN. tit. 45, §4501.01 (1958) "Vehicle -Everything on wheels or runners,
except vehicles operated exclusively on rails or tracks . . . . Motor Vehicle-Any
vehicle propelled or drawn by power other than muscular power ... "
